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Viewing cable 10STATE10900, S) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHINA ON THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10STATE10900 2010-02-03 15:03 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #0900 0341556
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031549Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0000
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T STATE 010900 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2035 
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA IR CH MY
SUBJECT: (S) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHINA ON THE 
MALAYSIA-BASED COMPANY ELECTRONICS COMPONENT LIMITED 
 
REF: A. 09 STATE 130917 
     B. 09 BEIJING 003476 
 
Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM, REASON: 1.4 (C). 
 
1. (U) This is an action request.  Embassy Beijing, please 
see paragraph 4. 
 
2.  (S) Background/Objective: In December 2009, the United 
States shared with China information regarding attempts by 
the Malaysia-based firm Electronics Component Limited (ECL) 
to buy TRS-500 gyroscopes from the Chinese firm VibTel 
Industrial Co. Inc. (Ref A).  These gyroscopes, which are 
controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
and China's missile-related export controls, would be 
suitable for use in the guidance systems of ballistic 
missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.  We 
requested China investigate this information because ECL is 
associated with a network of Iranian-controlled front 
companies that procure sensitive goods on behalf of a number 
of Iranian entities of proliferation concern. 
 
3.  (S) Chinese officials agreed to investigate this 
information, but asked for additional details on ECL's 
relationships with firms in Iran (Ref B).  To support their 
efforts in this case, we would like to inform them that ECL 
is part of a network of Iranian-controlled front companies 
that includes the Iranian firm Shahin Sefid Esta and the 
Malaysia-based front company Skylife Worldwide Sdn Bhd.  This 
network procures sensitive goods on behalf of a number of 
Iranian entities of proliferation concern, including the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1737-designated entities Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group 
(SHIG) and Ya Mahdi Industries.  We want to provide this 
information to Chinese officials and emphasize that we 
believe the transfer of this controlled equipment to a 
company linked to UNSCR-designated entities would be 
prohibited pursuant to UNSCR 1737. 
 
4.  (S) Action Request:  Request Embassy Beijing approach 
appropriate host government officials to deliver talking 
points/non-paper in paragraph 5 below and report response. 
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper. 
 
5.  (S) Begin talking points/non-paper: 
 
(SECRET//REL CHINA) 
 
--In December 2009, we shared with you information regarding 
attempts by the Malaysia-based firm Electronics Component 
Limited (ECL) to buy TRS-500 gyroscopes from the Chinese firm 
VibTel Industrial Co. Inc. 
 
--TRS-500 gyroscopes are controlled by the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) and China's missile-related export 
controls, and can be used in the guidance systems of 
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial 
vehicles. 
 
--We also noted that ECL is associated with a network of 
Iranian-controlled front companies that procure sensitive 
goods on behalf of a number of Iranian entities of 
proliferation concern. 
 
--In response to this information, you agreed to look into 
this matter, but asked if the United States could provide 
additional details on ECL's relationships with firms in Iran. 
 
--We now want to provide you with additional information 
indicating that ECL is part of a network of 
Iranian-controlled front companies that includes the Iranian 
firm Shahin Sefid Esta and the Malaysia-based front company 
Skylife Worldwide Sdn Bhd. 
 
--This network procures sensitive goods on behalf of a number 
of Iranian entities of proliferation concern, including the 
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), which is Iran's 
primary developer of liquid propellant ballistic missiles, 
and Heavy Metal Industries, a front company for the tactical 
missile developer Ya Mahdi Industries. 
 
--Both SHIG and Ya Mahdi Industries are sanctioned under 
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737. 
 
--Additionally, the TRS-500 gyroscopes are controlled items 
that would be prohibited from being exported to Iran under 
UNSCR 1737. 
 
--We hope this information is useful in supporting your 
efforts in this case and assists your ability to prevent the 
transfer of these gyroscopes by VibTel Industrial Co. to ECL. 
 
--We look forward to future cooperation on nonproliferation 
issues and to hearing the results of your investigation into 
this activity at the earliest possible time. 
 
End talking points/non-paper 
 
6.  (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR John Paul Herrmann (Phone: 
202-647-1430).  Please slug any reporting on this issue for 
ISN/MTR and EAP/CM. 
 
7.  (U) A word version of this document will be posted at 
www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. 
CLINTON