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Viewing cable 10STATE9124, MOBILIZING PRESSURE TO PERSUADE IRAN'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10STATE9124 2010-01-29 03:03 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO0917
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RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #9124/01 0290351
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO IAEA MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 3003
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 6188
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 0260
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2152
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 0510
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA IMMEDIATE 0095
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 2312
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 4840
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0422
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 1808
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 1943
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 7765
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 7395
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4807
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 009124 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2030 
TAGS: PARM PREL IR UNSC
SUBJECT: MOBILIZING PRESSURE TO PERSUADE IRAN'S 
ENGAGEMENT ON ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
 
Classified by NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey D. Feltman 
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
REF A: STATE 120288 
 
1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see 
paragraphs 2-5. 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2.  (C) The United States, along with its partners, has 
made an unprecedented effort to engage Iran in an effort 
to diplomatically resolve the international community's 
concerns with Iran's nuclear program.  Iran's lack of 
constructive response so far, and its continued 
reluctance to cooperate with international efforts to 
build confidence and transparency in its nuclear 
program, demand a response.  Department requests posts 
to draw on the attached narrative to explain our 
rationale for why  sharpening the choice that Iran 
faces, by increasing pressure, is necessary at this 
point, and to secure the cooperation of host governments 
in these efforts.  End Summary. 
 
 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
3.  (C) FOR ALL POSTS (except Moscow, Paris, Beijing, 
London and Berlin): Please draw on narrative beginning 
in paragraph 11 to: 
 
-- Highlight U.S. efforts to mobilize diplomatic 
engagement with Iran in 2009; 
 
-- Underscore the lack of a meaningful Iranian response 
to those efforts, especially since the P5+1 political 
directors meeting with Iran in Geneva on October 1, 
2009; 
 
-- Outline U.S. view of next steps, including increasing 
pressure on Iran; and 
 
-- Seek enhanced bilateral cooperation to increase 
pressure. 
 
4.  (C) FOR MOSCOW, PARIS, BEIJING, LONDON, AND BERLIN: 
Posts may share the general tenor of our message but do 
not need to deploy the points themselves with host 
governments. 
 
5.  (C) Points should be deployed by Ambassadors to most 
appropriate senior counterparts.  Posts may not leave 
any part of this message in writing with host 
governments. 
 
DEADLINE 
-------- 
 
6.  (U) Posts should report any substantive response to 
their efforts by February 3.  Elisa Catalano (NEA/FO, 
catalanoe@state.sgov.gov, 647-9533) and Richard Nephew 
(ISN/RA, nephewrm@state.sgov.gov, 647-7680) are the 
Department's POCs. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
7.  (SBU) With its P5+1 partners, the U.S. has been 
pursuing a policy towards Iran that includes engagement 
 
STATE 00009124  002 OF 006 
 
 
and incentives, as well as pressure.  Since the 1 
October 2009 meeting of the P5+1 Political Directors and 
representatives from Iran, the United States has been 
working closely with its partners to engage with Iran to 
build international confidence in the peaceful nature of 
its nuclear program.  Based on the agreement in 
principle reached with Iran in Geneva, we have focused 
on supporting the IAEA's proposal for refueling the 
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), facilitating the IAEA's 
investigation of the previously clandestine uranium 
enrichment plant at Qom, and pressing for a follow-on 
meeting between P5+1 Political Directors and Iranian 
representatives explicitly on Iran's nuclear program. 
 
8.  (C) The results since October 1 have been 
disappointing.  Iran has not accepted the IAEA's TRR 
proposal; instead, Iran has rejected a series of updated 
and more flexible proposals from the IAEA and our 
partners on some terms of the proposal (REF A), and has 
offered a substantially different counterproposal which 
fails to address the concerns about its nuclear program, 
does not fulfill the objective of building confidence in 
Iran's nuclear intentions, and, as EU High 
Representative Lady Ashton described, in effect rejects 
the IAEA's proposal.  Iran has also announced its intent 
to expand its nuclear program, including its intention 
to start enriching uranium to higher levels to make its 
own TRR fuel if its terms are not accepted on the fuel 
deal.  Although Iran granted IAEA access to the facility 
at Qom, its cooperation was limited and there remain 
serious questions about Iran's intentions for the 
facility, which is in open defiance of five UN Security 
Council resolutions.  Finally, Iran to date has gone 
back on its earlier commitment to meet again with the 
P5+1 to discuss its nuclear program. 
 
9.  (SBU) Former IAEA Director General El-Baradei 
released his latest report on Iran on November 16, 2009, 
and the IAEA Board of Governors (BoG) adopted a 
resolution on Iran on November 27, 2009.  The resolution 
notes the Board of Governors' serious concern that Iran 
continues to defy the requirements and obligations 
contained in UNSC resolutions and IAEA resolutions.  The 
Board of Governors also expressed its serious concern 
that contrary to the request of the Board of Governors 
and requirements of the UN Security Council, Iran has 
neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor provided 
the access necessary for the IAEA to provide assurance 
as to the absence of additional undeclared nuclear 
activities. 
 
10.  (U) President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and other 
P5+1 leaders identified the end of 2009 as a key period 
for assessing Iran's responsiveness.  While the offer of 
engagement remains on the table, we have begun to work 
with partners to prepare new measures to increase 
pressure on Iran. 
 
DIPLOMATIC POLICY NARRATIVE 
--------------------------- 
 
11.  (U)  Begin talking points: 
 
Overview: Where We've Been, and Where We Are 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
-- The President made clear his readiness to open a new 
page in our relations with Iran, based on mutual 
respect. This new approach featured our offer to engage 
Iran directly, as well as our readiness to become a full 
and active participant in the P5+1's efforts to resolve 
international concerns about Iran's nuclear program 
through negotiations. 
 
-- We stated clearly our support for Iran's right to the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy provided Iran meets its 
 
STATE 00009124  003 OF 006 
 
 
international obligations and carries out its 
responsibilities within the NPT framework. 
 
-- When we met with the Iranian delegation in Geneva on 
October 1, along with our P5+1 partners, we sought 
Iran's commitment to three concrete actions, which would 
demonstrate its intentions for its nuclear program: 
 
--  support the IAEA's proposal for refueling the 
Tehran Research Reactor; 
 
--  facilitate the IAEA's full investigation of the 
previously clandestine uranium enrichment plant at 
Qom; 
 
--  agree to a follow-on meeting between P5+1 
Political Directors and Iranian representatives by 
the end of October, explicitly focused on nuclear 
issues but also open to discussion of any issues 
raised by any party. 
-- Each of these agreed actions presented Iran with an 
important opportunity to begin to assure the 
international community about its intentions for its 
nuclear program and to pursue together a diplomatic 
resolution to our differences. 
 
-- Iran has not followed through on any of these three 
commitments. 
 
-- President Obama also stated last year that we would 
continually assess Iran's responsiveness to these 
offers, and that the end of the year would present a key 
period of assessment. 
 
-- It is increasingly clear that Iran has not taken 
advantage of the opportunities we have offered. 
 
-- A year into the Obama administration, Iran has not 
taken practical, concrete steps that would begin to 
create confidence in its nuclear intentions.  Iran: 
 
--  Continues to enrich uranium despite UNSC 
requirements that it suspend such operations; 
 
--  Revealed it had been building a secret uranium 
enrichment facility at a military base near Qom, in 
violation of its safeguards agreement and UN 
Security Council resolutions; 
 
--  Continues to refuse cooperation with the IAEA 
in addressing the full range of IAEA questions 
about the peaceful purposes of its nuclear program; 
 
--  Has not accepted the IAEA proposal to refuel 
the TRR, which was a response to an Iranian 
request, despite U.S. and our partners' significant 
efforts to be flexible and address Iranian concerns 
with the deal; and 
 
--  Since meeting with representatives of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council and 
Germany in Geneva on October 1, has refused all 
subsequent efforts to schedule another meeting to 
discuss its nuclear program. 
 
--  Iran has not been able to say "yes" to a balanced 
IAEA proposal that would provide fuel for its Tehran 
Research Reactor and begin to build mutual trust and 
confidence, notably by transferring 1,200kgs of its low 
enriched uranium abroad as an indication of Iran's 
peaceful nuclear intent. 
 
--  Underscoring the significance of the IAEA's TRR 
proposal, in November 2009, former IAEA DG ElBaradei 
said that the proposal had "extensive built-in 
guarantees...the Russians are guaranteeing implementation. 
 
STATE 00009124  004 OF 006 
 
 
The Americans are ready for the first time to guarantee 
the implementation.  The [IAEA] will take custody of 
Iran's material so the international community as a 
whole will guarantee" implementation. 
 
--  On Iran's desire to retain possession of its nuclear 
material under delivery of the fuel (which is the basis 
of Iran's counterproposal), Dr. ElBaradei rejected this 
approach, saying publicly in November after Iran first 
raised this idea that this would "defeat the whole 
purpose of the IAEA's agreement...this is not a 
solution."; 
 
--  While it allowed IAEA inspectors to visit its newly 
revealed enrichment site near Qom, it did not provide 
the IAEA with the full access the organization 
requested, notably by agreeing to the IAEA's request for 
access to specific Iranian nuclear officials and 
answering IAEA questions regarding the history and 
purpose of the facility.  The clandestine construction 
of this facility was inconsistent with Iran's IAEA 
Safeguards Agreement, and is in open defiance of UN 
Security Council resolutions. 
 
--  As the IAEA reported in November 2009, Iran 
continues to develop its nuclear program regardless of 
international concerns and IAEA, NPT, and UNSC 
requirements - most starkly in its construction of a 
secret uranium enrichment facility at a military base 
near Qom.  As former Director General El-Baradei's 
report on November 16 outlines, this facility and the 
circumstances surrounding it raises the persistent 
question of additional such undeclared facilities. 
 
--  The IAEA report makes clear that Iran has failed to 
cooperate fully and transparently with the IAEA, 
answering questions about the use of this facility and 
the possibility of other facilities. 
 
--  Iran has failed to take advantage of the creative 
TRR proposal, engage with us constructively on other 
elements of its nuclear program, and cooperate fully 
with the IAEA.  It also still defies UNSC requirements 
that it suspend its enrichment program, instead 
announcing an expansion of its nuclear program.  Even 
more, it is threatening to begin enriching its LEU to 
higher levels of enrichment if the international 
community does not accept a TRR deal on its terms, terms 
that would not build confidence as they would reduce and 
delay transfers of LEU from Iran. 
 
--  Iran's continued nuclear activities and its refusal 
to engage meaningfully with the international community 
risks a possible arms race in the region and undermines 
the global international nonproliferation regime as a 
whole. 
 
--  As you know, Israel has stated that an Iran with 
nuclear weapons poses a great threat to its security and 
that it reserves the right to defend itself.  We believe 
Iran's continued non-compliance with its international 
obligations regarding its nuclear program poses serious 
threats to stability in the region.  Presenting Iran 
with a united global front is the best avenue to resolve 
the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic means. 
 
--  In addition to its disregard of its nuclear-related 
obligations, Iran continues to support terrorist 
organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, and militant 
groups in Iraq.  It also provides some support to the 
Taliban to facilitate attacks against ISAF forces in 
Afghanistan. 
 
--  Also of deep concern to the international community 
is the dramatic uptick in repression inside Iran.  As 
Secretary Clinton said recently, we are deeply disturbed 
 
STATE 00009124  005 OF 006 
 
 
by the ruthless repression that Iran is exercising 
against its citizens who seek to exercise their 
universal right to free expression and assembly. 
 
The Pressure Aspect of the Strategy: Making the Case 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
--  The two elements of the P5+1 strategy - 
engagement/incentives and pressure -- were always 
intended to run in parallel, because without a credible 
threat of consequences, it is unlikely that Iran will 
make a strategic or even tactical change in direction. 
 
--  For that reason, we have always recognized the 
possibility that we would need to increase pressure to 
sharpen the choice that Iran faces in order to persuade 
Iran that the international community is serious. 
 
--  Still, our emphasis over the course of this year has 
been on outreach and engagement rather than pressure. 
Unfortunately, to date, Iran has failed to respond 
constructively. 
 
--  Pressure is not an end in itself; it is a means to 
encourage Iran to recalculate costs and benefits, and to 
return to a course of constructive engagement at the 
negotiating table.  But without unmistakable and 
meaningful consequences, there seems little prospect for 
such a return. 
 
--  The international community has already imposed 
strict measures on Iran via various multilateral fora to 
demonstrate that Iran cannot ignore its responsibilities 
without cost.  We believe a more aggressive enforcement 
of this existing and robust international framework, 
along with the application of significant additional 
pressure, will illustrate to Iran the sharp choices it 
faces should it continue to rebuff efforts to resolve 
our differences diplomatically. 
 
--  Unity among members of the international community 
is absolutely essential to demonstrate to Iran that 
there are serious consequences for its continued refusal 
to engage constructively with the international 
community over its nuclear program.  Such unity was 
clear when the IAEA Board of Governors adopted its Iran 
resolution in November. It was also clear in the 
European Council's declaration on Iran issued in 
December.  Both were useful and immediate opportunities 
to increase pressure on Iran. 
 
--  We believe Iran's continued non-compliance regarding 
its nuclear program deserves the full and urgent 
attention of the international community. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
-- We stand behind our offer to engage with Iran, but we 
are rapidly approaching the moment when we will have to 
give full meaning to all elements of our strategy.  We, 
along with our partners, believe that the time has come 
to increase pressure on Iran.  Such pressure is 
necessary to uphold the integrity of the UNSC and IAEA, 
and demonstrate that continued non-compliance has 
consequences. 
 
-- The U.S. believes that multilateral pressure would be 
best achieved through new UN Security Council action and 
swift implementation of that action. 
 
-- However, UN action alone may not be sufficient to 
persuade Iran to change course.  There is much more that 
can and should be done immediately to implement measures 
already required under the existing international 
sanctions framework.  We therefore ask our partners to 
 
STATE 00009124  006 OF 006 
 
 
ensure that we are collectively enforcing all those 
measures that are already in place as comprehensively as 
possible. 
 
-- We regret that Iran has missed repeated opportunities 
for meaningful engagement.  Our intent is not to 
escalate a conflict, but to press for a diplomatic 
resolution.  Inaction is what the Iranians are hoping 
for, as they draw closer to achieving a nuclear weapons 
capability. 
 
-- On January 16, we and our P5+1 partners met to take 
stock and discuss next steps regarding Iran.  As the 
Chair's statement reflects, we agreed that Iran has 
failed to follow up on the key understandings reached in 
our meeting with the Iranian delegation on October 1, 
2009.  We are united and remain committed to our 
approach - while we will continue to seek a negotiated 
diplomatic solution, we believe it is time for 
consideration of appropriate further measures. 
 
-- We are here today to intensify our consultations with 
you, as one of our partners in the international 
community, on next appropriate steps aimed to persuade 
Iran to bring its nuclear program into full compliance 
with its international obligations. 
 
-- We urge these steps with steady determination that we 
must do everything we can, including applying greater 
pressure, to encourage Iran to return to a constructive 
course of engagement. 
 
FOR EU MEMBER STATES, USEU, AND TOKYO ONLY: 
 
-- As we move ahead with and beyond the UN process, we 
also will want to work with you to agree on additional 
actions we could take on a coordinated, national basis 
to magnify the impact of a new Security Council 
Resolution and demonstrate to Iran our seriousness of 
purpose. 
CLINTON