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Viewing cable 10RABAT34, MOROCCO AND BURKINA FASO CONSULTATIONS ON GUINEA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10RABAT34 2010-01-20 19:07 2010-12-09 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rabat
VZCZCXRO3319
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0034/01 0201924
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201924Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1060
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 0024
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 0601
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0994
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 0007
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0109
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0206
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0145
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL 0113
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 0067
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0526
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN 0044
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0663
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME 0572
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1187
RUEHPA/AMEMBASSY PRAIA 0013
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 0061
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000034 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR AF, AF/W, NEA, NEA/MAG AND INR/AA 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2020 
TAGS: PINS PGOV MARR PREL MO UV GV
SUBJECT: MOROCCO AND BURKINA FASO CONSULTATIONS ON GUINEA 

REF: A. RABAT 0022 
B. RABAT 0008 

RABAT 00000034 001.2 OF 002 


Classified By: DCM Robert Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1. (C) Summary: Moroccan Director General for Studies and 
Documentation (DGED) Mansouri met with President Compaore, 
Guinean General Konate and Guinean Captain Dadis Camara in 
Ouagadougou on January 18. According to a senior Moroccan 
MFA official, Mansouri assured Compoare that the GOM 
appreciated his efforts to mediate the crisis in Guinea and 
asked him to take a softer stance toward Konate as the leader 
of the Guinea transition. To Konate, he offered Moroccan 
political and material support for the transition. And to 
Dadis, Mansouri promised continued Moroccan medical 
assistance throughout his convalescence, but also strongly 
dissuaded him from returning to Rabat. Looking to next 
steps, the GOM urged the USG not to "rush" the International 
Criminal Court's investigation, noting that while Morocco 
does not condone "impunity" for the crimes that occurred in 
Conakry, it also fears that an early ICC warrant for Dadis 
Camara's arrest could destabilize the Guinea transition. End 
Summary. 

2. (C) On January 18, Ambassador Nasser Bourita, Director 
General for Multilateral Relations and Chief of Staff to 
Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri, offered DCM and PolCouns 
a readout of Moroccan director of external intelligence and 
national security advisor equivalent) Mohammed Yassine 
Mansouri's trip to Ouagadougou. During his January 18 visit, 
Mansouri met separately with Burkinabe President Blaise 
Compaore, Guinean General Sekouba Konate, and Captian Moussa 
Dadis Camara. 

--------------------------------- 
Morocco's Messages in Ouagadougou 
--------------------------------- 

3. (C) Mansouri delivered three separate messages to each of 
his interlocutors, Bourita told us. First, he sought to  reassure Compaore that Rabat greatly appreciated his personal 
efforts to mediate the Guinea crisis, his close coordination 
with Morocco, and Burkina Faso's willingness to receive 
Dadis. Alluding to the Moroccan MFA's bitterness over its 
perception that Compaore may have torpedoed French, Moroccan 
and U.S. efforts to find an African country to accept Dadis 
for resettlement -- and apparent Burkinabe anger at Rabat's 
abrupt decision to send him by medical plane to Ouagadougou 
(Ref A) -- Bourita said that Mansouri also calmed the waters 
with Compaore and secured agreement for continued future 
cooperation. Finally, Mansouri urged Compaore to "reflect a 
bit" on his initial distrust of Konate, and to realize that, 
given the circumstances and poor alternatives, he was not 
necessarily a bad choice to lead the Guinean transition. 

4. (C) In discussions with Konate, Mansouri assured him that 
the GOM fully supported his efforts to lead the transition 
and brainstormed with him as to what Morocco's most effective 
roles might be, Bourita reported. Mansouri noted that 
Morocco would be willing to offer materiel, funding and 
observers for elections; economic and development assistance 
to build water, electricity and other infrastructure; and, in 
coordination with the U.S. and France, assistance in 
rehabilitating and modernizing the armed forces. 

5. (C) As for Dadis, Mansouri promised that Moroccan  physicians would be with him throughout his convalescence in  Ouagadougou, and that during that time the GOM would continue  allow his wife and children, who remain in Rabat, to stay at  Morocco,s expense. Dadis suggested that he wished to return  to Morocco, Bourita said; however, Mansouri strongly  dissuaded him. The GOM would send as many medical personnel 

RABAT 00000034 002.2 OF 002 

as necessary to Burkina Faso, Bourita added, but it would not 
accept Dadis' return. "Since Dadis cannot come to Rabat, 
Rabat will go to Dadis," he said with a smile. 

------------------ 
Don't Rush the ICC 
------------------ 

6. (C) Looking forward, Bourita warmly welcomed the 
opportunity for Morocco to continue working closely with the 
U.S. and France on Guinea's transition. The GOM likewise 
welcomed the ICC's eventual investigation and likely issuance 
of an arrest order for Dadis. However, he cautioned, the GOM 
did not wish to see the ICC process result in additional 
instability in Guinea. "Camara is unstable, and therefore 
dangerous," he said; for this reason, France and the U.S. 
should take care not to "rush" the ICC process. Morocco does 
not support or accept impunity for Dadis, Bourita emphasized, 
but France, the U.S., Morocco and their African partners 
"need to move at a rate that is in harmony with one another 
and that does not disturb the process." He added that in 
addition to Mansouri's message to this effect in Ouagadougou, 
the MFA was reiterating it to France, Gabon and Nigeria, 
among others. Finally, Bourita said that the GOM looked 
forward to receiving an invitation from the African Union to 
attend the international contact group on Guinea,s January 
26 meeting in Addis Ababa. 


***************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco 
***************************************** 
KAPLAN