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Viewing cable 10RABAT22, WHY DID MOROCCO SEND DADIS CAMARA TO BURKINA FASO?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10RABAT22 2010-01-15 07:07 2010-12-09 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rabat
VZCZCXRO8688
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0022/01 0150743
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 150743Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1046
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 0022
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 0599
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 0005
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0107
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0204
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1295
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0143
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL 0111
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 0065
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0524
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0005
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0661
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0574
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3862
RUEHPA/AMEMBASSY PRAIA 0011
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0727
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0463
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0047
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000022 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR AF/W, INR/AA AND NEA/MAG 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2020 
TAGS: PREL PINS GV MO UV
SUBJECT: WHY DID MOROCCO SEND DADIS CAMARA TO BURKINA FASO? 

RABAT 00000022 001.2 OF 002 


Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1. (C) Summary: Following the Secretary,s conversation with 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Taieb Fassi Fihri, the Embassy 
was surprised to learn January 12 of the Government of 
Morocco,s (GOM,s) abrupt decision to discharge Guinean 
junta leader Dadis Camara from the Mohammed V Military 
Hospital in Rabat and send him by medical plane to 
Ouagadougou. A January 11 telephone conversation between 
King Mohammed VI and Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore, 
Security Council consideration of the report on the September 
28 massacre in Conakry, and pressure from Dadis, supporters 
to repatriate him appear to have motivated the GOM,s action. 
Believing that President Campaore may have torpedoed French, 
Moroccan and U.S. efforts to find an African country that 
would accept Dadis for resettlement, King Mohammed VI 
intended to place responsibility for continued mediation of 
the Guinea conflict squarely in Campaore,s court. The GOM 
supported U.S. requests to keep Dadis Camara from using 
contracted civilian air arranged by his supporters for return 
to Conakry, and transported him via Moroccan &medical8 
airlift to Burkina Faso without telling him that he would not 
be returning to Conakry. Finally, the GOM pledged continued 
support for U.S. and French requests to establish a new 
residence for Dadis Camara to keep him out of Guinea and for 
Guinea,s transition. End Summary. 

2. (C) Embassy Rabat learned the afternoon of January 12 
that the GOM intended to facilitate the departure of Dadis 
Camara for Burkina Faso by the end of the day. According to 
Ambassador Nasser Bourita, Chief of Staff of the Moroccan 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Dadis Camara was 
aware of events in Guinea, had been well enough to travel for 
at least three weeks, and his return had been formally 
requested by the Guinean Ministry of Foreign Affairs through 
the Moroccan Ambassador to Guinea. Bourita stated that King 
Mohammed VI, who reportedly spoke with Burkina Faso President 
Blaise Compaore on January 11, wanted Compaore to assume 
responsibility as mediator of the Guinean conflict vice 
remaining angry that he had not been party to the Rabat 
Declaration of January 5. It was the king,s further desire 
that Dadis Camara not be in Morocco when the UN Security 
Council considered the contents of the United Nations report 
on the September massacres in Guinea. Bourita asked for U.S. 
support to keep the travel secret from the Government of 
Burkina Faso, which he stated was not advised until shortly 
before Dadis' arrival of the GOM,s intent to deliver Dadis 
Camara to Ouagadougou that day. 

3. (C) Embassy Rabat demarched the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs late January 12, requesting the GOM not permit Dadis 
Camara to utilize a rented airplane arranged by his 
supporters in Guinea for return to Guinea. The GOM honored 
that request and Dadis Camara departed Rabat for Ouagadougou 
between 1845 and 1900 GMT aboard a Moroccan &medical plane8 
in the company of two Moroccan doctors (one an 
anesthesiologist), a Moroccan nurse, a Lebanese doctor, and a 
Guinean cardiologist. Dadis reportedly thought he was going 
to Conakry and was &calm8 although the previous day, he had 
reportedly told Fassi Fihri that he wanted to return to 
Conakry to &cut off hands and heads.8 Camara landed in 
Ouagadougou before 21:45 GMT on January 12. 

4. (C) The GOM expressed its intent to reach out to the 
Government of Saudi Arabia in support of the U.S. and French 
demarches urging Saudi Arabia to accept Dadis Camara for 
residency, just as King Mohammed VI had reached out to 
Gabonese President Ali Bongo, who declined to host Dadis. 
The GOM also reached out to General Sekouba Konate on both 
January 12 and 13 to reassure him that Morocco remained 

RABAT 00000022 002.2 OF 002 

supportive of his efforts to lead a transition. The GOM reportedly also urged President Campaore to host Dadis Camara  for more than five days -- as Campaore had reportedly stated  the night Dadis arrived. 

5. (C) Comment: The timing of the king,s decision was  surprising, if not entirely unexpected. While not in accord with the spirit of the January 5 declaration, the GOM had  always said that it needed a legal basis to keep Dadis and  did not want him in Morocco when the Security Council  considered the report on the massacre. The GOM remains  hopeful that Dadis Camara will not return to Guinea. 
Morocco,s willingness to work with the U.S. and France to  prevent Dadis from taking contracted air back to Guinea,  bought some time. Moreover, Morocco remains interested in  participating in the international contact group meeting in  Addis Ababa in late January. End Comment. 

6. (U) Conakry and Tripoli minimize considered. 


***************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco 
***************************************** 
KAPLAN