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Viewing cable 09STATE129362, U) SECRETARY CLINTON'S DECEMBER 14, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE129362 2009-12-18 15:03 2010-12-16 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO0471
PP RUEHLA
DE RUEHC #9362/01 3521521
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181518Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 3455
INFO RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 6907
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 2770
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA PRIORITY 6188
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2786
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 7533
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 6241
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5109
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 129362

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019
TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY KDRG OVIP MOPS MNUC MARR PREL
PGOV, ZL, AF, CU, WI, EUN, SP
SUBJECT: (U) SECRETARY CLINTON'S DECEMBER 14, 2009
CONVERSATION WITH SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER MIGUEL ANGEL
MORATINOS

1. Classified by EUR A/S Philip H. Gordon. Reason: 1.4 (d)

2. (U) December 14, 2009; 10:15 a.m.; Washington, DC.

3. (U) Participants:

U.S.
The Secretary
Spokesman Ian Kelly
Assistant Secretary Philip H. Gordon
Special Assistant Joe MacManus
NSC Tobin Bradley
Alexandra McKnight (EUR Notetaker)

SPAIN
Foreign Minister Moratinos
Director General for the EU Miguel Angel Navarro
Director General for North America and non-EU Europe
Fernandez de la Pena
Ambassador Jorge Dezcallar
Deputy Communications Director Aranzazu Banon

4. (C) SUMMARY. During the Secretary,s December 14 meeting
with Foreign Minister Moratinos, she noted that President
Obama and President Zapatero set the tone for current
positive bilateral relations during the October 13 White
House summit, and that there is much opportunity for
collaboration ahead. The Secretary expressed appreciation
for Spanish troop and trainer commitments in Afghanistan, for
continued use of Spanish bases, and for Zapatero,s
commitment to resettle five Guantanamo detainees. On the
Balkans, she stressed the need to continue the Butmir Process
and maintain EUFOR. Moratinos mentioned the proposed Madrid
U.S-EU Summit, and the Secretary responded that the U.S.
would let the EU handle its internal deliberations on
structure under Lisbon Treaty arrangements. The Secretary
regretted that President Obama,s schedule did not permit him
to receive King Juan Carlos in early December but noted that
the White House is looking into the date of January 25 for a
visit. END SUMMARY.

-----------
AFGHANISTAN
-----------

5. (C) The Secretary thanked Moratinos for Spain,s
commitment of additional troops and aid in Afghanistan,
noting her appreciation as well for sustained US use of
Spanish bases Rota and Moron, calling them &critical in our
effort.8 Moratinos said that U.S. use of the bases is
&permanent8 and lauded ongoing military-to-military
cooperation. He noted that the Minister of Defense has
expressed interest in making &technical adjustments8 to the
defense cooperation agreement, but that the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has impressed upon the MOD its opposition to
Spain asking to re-open the DCA.

6. (C) Moratinos said Spain is &extremely committed8 to
the mission in Afghanistan and noted Spain,s desire to go
&above and beyond.8 On December 17, the Ministry of
Defense will officially announce a further contribution of
522 troops (and note Spain,s previous commitment of 40
additional Guardia Civil), and the Ministries of Defense and
Foreign Affairs will jointly announce a contribution to the
Afghan National Trust Fund. Moratinos did not give a
monetary figure but said it will be &in line with previous
commitments.8

7. (C) Looking toward London, Moratinos discussed his ideas
for a personal approach to agricultural development with the
Rural Development Bank and requested a bilateral working
group with the Afghans prior to London. The Secretary agreed
that it is feasible to work together to tee something up for
London and stressed once again her gratitude to President
Zapatero for his commitment to Afghanistan.

--------------------------------------------- ---------
BALKANS ) KOSOVO, PROPOSED MADRID CONFERENCE ON BOSNIA

STATE 00129362 002 OF 003


8. (C) The Secretary stressed to Moratinos the importance of
continuing the Butmir process. If Bosnians cannot agree by
early 2010, it is critical to maintain the Office of the High
Representative as the only stabilizing presence, especially
through October 2010 elections. She noted U.S. appreciation
of Spain,s commitment to keep its troops in EUFOR.
Assistant Secretary Gordon underlined the need for the U.S.
and Spain to continue the smooth cooperation begun with the
Swedes. EUFOR leaving, he noted, would be disconsonant with
our message of political engagement.

9. (C) Moratinos reminded the Secretary that his first
Foreign Service post was Belgrade and made two mentions of
his status as an honorary citizen of the city. During his
recent visit, he was pleased to notice for the first time a
sense of hope in Belgrade. He floated the idea of a
week-long &retreat8 in Madrid for Bosnian leaders, proposed
for the beginning of February. Moratinos also committed
Spain to working constructively on Kosovo as the EU
Presidency. Although he had differences with EU Kosovo
representative Pieter Feith, a recent discussion in Madrid
had left him convinced they could work together. The Serbs
know that Kosovo is independent, and they want to turn the
page, Moratinos noted, but they need time to digest that fact
and save face.

-------------------
GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
--------------------

10. (C) The Secretary was highly appreciative of Zapatero,s
commitment for Spain to take five Guantanamo detainees,
stressing that it was &a turning point8 among many other
European nations. Moratinos, in a resigned, subdued manner,
noted that &Zapatero wants to fulfill his promises(his word
is his word.8 He requested that Spain be passed additional
files to review in order to identify three more candidates
acceptable for resettlement in Spain.

--------------------------------------------- ----------
LATIN AMERICA ) EU COMMON POSITION ON CUBA AND HONDURAS
--------------------------------------------- ----------

11. (C) The Secretary thanked Moratinos for his sustained
efforts on Honduras and suggested staying in close contact.
Moratinos was particularly helpful, she noted, on encouraging
implementation of the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord. Turning
to Cuba, the Secretary pressed for continuation of the EU
Common Position on Cuba as the most effective way to maintain
pressure on the Cuban government on human rights conditions.
Moratinos took note of U.S. serious concern but said that
Spain believes a bilateral agreement is a more effective way
to keep up pressure on human rights. However, he noted this
would not be his &main priority8 during Spain,s
Presidency. During Moratinos, October trip to Cuba, he
said, Raul Castro confessed his desire to establish a
&secret channel of communication8 to the White House.
Moratinos suggested that President Obama and President
Zapatero might discuss details of such a channel at their
next meeting. While he understood U.S. domestic political
difficulties, Moratinos believed Castro,s comment that U.S.
release of the five Cuban spies would enable Cuba to release
all/all of its political prisoners.

----------------------
PALOMARES Nuclear Site
----------------------

12. (C) Moratinos asked the Secretary for &a real
response(whatever you can do8 to be helpful in terms of
Spanish public opinion, which he feared could turn against
the U.S. if news of the results of a recent study of the
site,s nuclear contamination were to spread. The Secretary
noted that she remembered the accident when it happened but
made no commitment.

--------------------------------------------- ---
ONE-ON-ONE DISCUSSION OF IRAN AND WESTERN SAHARA
--------------------------------------------- ---

13. (C) The Secretary and Moratinos had a private one-on-one
conversation, during which they discussed Iran, with
Moratinos agreeing that we are moving towards increased

STATE 00129362 003 OF 003

SUBJECT: (U) SECRETARY CLINTON'S DECEMBER 14, 2009
CONVERSATION WITH SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER MIGUEL ANG
sanctions and pressure and that we must continue close
cooperation. They also touched on Western Sahara activist
Aminadou Haidar, and the Secretary noted that France, the
U.S. and Spain all need to work together to convince Algeria
to open its borders. They mentioned the possibility of King
Juan Carlos calling King Mohammad VI to discuss options for
resolving the situation.
CLINTON