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Viewing cable 09STATE122950, IRAN'S SHIG USING INTERMEDIARIES IN EFFORT TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE122950 2009-12-01 17:05 2010-12-05 12:12 SECRET Secretary of State
Appears in these articles:
http://www.spiegel.de
VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2950 3351728
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 011724Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0000
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T STATE 122950 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2034 
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA GE IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S SHIG USING INTERMEDIARIES IN EFFORT TO 
PROCURE TEST EQUIPMENT FROM GERMAN FIRMS (S) 
 
REF: A. 2008 STATE 029412 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. 2008 BERLIN 000372 
     C. 2008 BERLIN 000637 
     D. STATE 019370 AND PREVIOUS 
     E. BERLIN 000263 
     F. BERLIN 000542 
 
Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASON 1.4 (C). 
 
1. (U) This is an action request.  Embassy Berlin, please see 
paragraph 4. 
 
2. (S) Background and Objective:  We want to advise German 
officials of information indicating that as of June 2009, two 
Iranian intermediary firms offered test equipment manufactured 
by the German firms Rohde & Schwarz and Hottinger Baldwin 
Messtechnik (HBM) to Iran's primary developer of liquid-fueled 
ballistic missiles, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group 
(SHIG). 
While this equipment is not controlled by the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it could be used in 
ballistic missile testing applications.  Moreover, SHIG made 
specific requests for items manufactured by Rohde & Schwarz 
and HBM, and goods produced by the two firms were the targets 
of previous, long-running procurement efforts by SHIG and the 
Iranian procurement network Farazeh Equipment Distributor 
Company (FEDCO, which may have been acting on behalf of SHIG) 
(Refs).  In both cases, German officials investigated the 
information we provided and sensitized the firms to their 
concerns.  (Note: In the HBM case, the company reported that 
it did receive a request from Evertop Services (a FEDCO 
affiliate), but that the request was rejected.  End note.)  We 
want to share this new information with German officials and 
encourage them to continue their efforts to prevent SHIG or 
other Iranian entities of proliferation concern from procuring 
sensitive items from Rohde & Schwarz and HBM. 
 
3.  Action Request: Request Embassy Berlin approach 
appropriate host government officials to deliver talking 
points/non-paper in paragraph 4 below and report response. 
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper. 
 
4.  (S) Begin talking points/non-paper: 
 
(SECRET//REL GERMANY) 
 
-- We would like to alert you to information of proliferation 
concern and request your assistance in investigating this 
activity. 
 
-- Between 2007 and 2009, we discussed with you on numerous 
occasions information indicating that Iranian entities of 
proliferation concern were seeking equipment manufactured by 
the German firms Rohde & Schwarz and Hottinger Baldwin 
Messtechnik (HBM). 
 
-- Specifically, we advised you that the Shahid Hemmat 
Industrial Group (SHIG, Iran's primary developer of liquid 
fueled ballistic missiles) and entities affiliated with the 
Farazeh Equipment Distributor Company (FEDCO) were engaged in 
efforts to procure Rohde & Schwarz and HBM equipment. 
 
-- We were pleased to subsequently hear that German officials 
had sensitized representatives of both firms to proliferation 
concerns related to SHIG and FEDCO, and that HBM had rejected 
a request from Evertop Services, an entity affiliated with 
FEDCO. 
 
-- We now want to share with you related information 
indicating that as of June 2009, SHIG was seeking test 
equipment via Iranian intermediaries from both Rohde & Schwarz 
and HBM. 
 
-- Specifically, we understand that the Tehran-based Heydari 
Ofogh Sanat Anvar Company offered SHIG an ESIB model 
electromagnetic interference test receiver and spectrum 
analyzer manufactured by Rohde & Schwarz. 
 
-- We also understand that the Iranian company Hamim 
Commercial offered SHIG pressure transducers and other 
equipment produced by HBM. 
 
-- While this equipment is not controlled by the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it could be used in 
ballistic missile testing applications. 
 
-- We do not know if the Iranian intermediaries are already in 
possession of the Rohde & Schwarz and HBM equipment, but 
wanted to make you aware of the fact that Iran's missile 
program made specific requests for items manufactured by these 
German firms. 
 
-- We also want to reiterate that SHIG often conducts its 
business through front companies and middlemen posing as end 
users. 
 
-- Given SHIG's interest in this equipment and the previous 
Iranian efforts to acquire Rohde & Schwarz and HBM equipment, 
we wanted to share this latest information with you, and urge 
you to continue your work to prevent these firms from acting, 
even unwittingly, as suppliers to SHIG and other Iranian 
entities of proliferation concern. 
 
-- We look forward to continuing our excellent cooperation on 
nonproliferation matters and to hearing of any updates related 
to this case. 
 
5.  (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR John Paul Herrmann (Phone: 
202-647-1430).  Please slug any reporting on this issue for 
ISN/MTR, EUR/CE, and EUR/PRA. 
 
6.  (U) A word version of this document will be posted at 
www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. 
CLINTON