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Viewing cable 09RABAT1018, GUINEA LATEST: DADIS AND BEYOND?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09RABAT1018 2009-12-31 14:02 2010-12-09 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Rabat
VZCZCXRO9054
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #1018/01 3651455
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 311455Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1009
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 0013
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0593
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0987
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0081
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0101
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0198
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0133
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL PRIORITY 0105
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 0059
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0518
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY 0038
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 0566
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY 0572
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1181
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0454
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0055
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001018 

SIPDIS 
NOFORN 

STATE FOR AF, AF/W, NEA, NEA/MAG, AND INR/AA 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2020 
TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL PINR GV MO
SUBJECT: GUINEA LATEST: DADIS AND BEYOND? 

REF: A. RABAT 1009 
B. RABAT 0988 

RABAT 00001018 001.2 OF 002 


Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 

1. (S/NF) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOffs on 
December 30 that despite Dadis Camara's apparent desire to 
depart Morocco (Ref A), he is in no condition to travel and 
will not be able to resume control of the country. Minister 
of National Defense Sekouba Konate and an assistant, Mr. Bah, 
along with Minister of Communications Idrissa Cherif have 
been in Rabat to visit Dadis, but Konate planned to return to 
Guinea by December 31, possibly to present to the Guinean 
people a case for his assumption of power in place of Dadis. 
The next ten days would be telling and potentially chaotic 
for the country, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, but with the 
assistance of the international community, Konate should be 
able to control the army and avert violence that could have 
regional implications. End Summary. 

2. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOffs on December 
30 that Dadis Camara was in no condition to travel and would 
not be able to control Guinea again. XXXXXXXXXXXX said 
that Dadis Camara still had a bullet in his head, suffered from impaired 
vision and speech, and was not fully aware of his 
surroundings. XXXXXXXXXXXX  admitted that he had not 
seen Dadis; according to him only Konate and Bah were allowed 
into his room. Regarding earlier news reports that Dadis was 
preparing to speak to the Guinean people, XXXXXXXXXXXX
 said that if Dadis could speak to the media, he certainly would 
have by now. Evidently Dadis also suffered from heart 
problems unrelated to the gunshot wounds. 

3. (S/NF) Konate evidently was not in the best of health, 
either, and sought medical consultation while here in Rabat. 
Reportedly a heavy drinker, Konate suffered from liver 
problems consistent with his intake of large amounts of 
alcohol. On December 30, senior Moroccan military officials 
separately questioned Konate's fitness to lead, calling him 
weak. 

4. (S/NF) For XXXXXXXXXXXX,  Konate's travel to  Rabat allowed him to return to Guinea and report on the basis of his  first-hand knowledge that Dadis was unable to continue in his  role as leader of Guinea, paving the way for Konate to assume  power for a transitional period. Were Konate to attempt to  take control without having undertaken the trip to Rabat to  see Dadis, he would have been perceived as a traitor to Dadis  and have no legitimacy before the Guinean people and army.  Konate would then have Cherif and Claude Pivi, another CNDD  leader, arrested, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. 

5. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX went on to say that Cherif 
was behind demonstrations being planned for Conakry, 
while Pivi, who was from the same ethnic group as Dadis, 
might organize supporters on an ethnic basis and incite 
clashes with other groups. Given that ethnic and national 
boundaries are not coterminous, this could affect neighboring 
countries and plunge the entire region into chaos (Ref B), 
asserted XXXXXXXXXXXX. With the help of the United States 
and European countries, Konate would be able to take power 
and control the army, which lacked discipline and had too many 
crooks and militias, but XXXXXXXXXXXX did not specify what sort of 
assistance from the international community would be 
necessary. 

6. (S/NF) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX urged intervention, both to 
keep Dadis out of Guinea and to support an effort by Konate 
to take power in the country, in order to forestall 
devastating ethnic violence. His argument that Dadis would 

RABAT 00001018 002.2 OF 002 


have made a public statement by now if he could have is 
compelling, while his comment that Konate would have other 
CNDD leaders arrested suggests that the fate of Guinea does 
not depend on Dadis alone. Dadis has amassed militias and 
enjoys some popular support (Ref B), and for XXXXXXXXXXXX
 his return would undoubtedly lead to violence and unrest. 
His continued absence, however, might not preclude it. 
End Comment. 

7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 


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