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Viewing cable 09STOCKHOLM428, GAERC JULY 26-7 AGENDA: SWEDEN'S PRELIMINARY ITEMS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STOCKHOLM428 2009-07-14 14:02 2011-01-13 05:05 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Stockholm
VZCZCXRO6973
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSM #0428/01 1951423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141423Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4510
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0158
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0140
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK PRIORITY 0095
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0148
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000428 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2018 
TAGS: PREL PARM IC NK BM SO IR KE GG UN EU SW
SUBJECT: GAERC JULY 26-7 AGENDA: SWEDEN'S PRELIMINARY ITEMS 
 
Classified By: Pol Couns Marc Koehler for reasons 1.4 (B) & (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary: On July 14, Poloffs met with MFA Deputy EU 
Correspondent Jonas Wendel to discuss the July 27-8 GAERC 
agenda.  He said that, as the Swedes intended, the agenda is 
short to focus discussion on the most important international 
issues.  Currently, there are three B items: conclusions on 
formulating a political strategy for Somalia; extending the 
mandates of EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and EU Special 
Representative (EUSR) Pierre Morel in Georgia; and the way 
forward with Iran (at lunch).  The possible A items are: 
support for the Kofi Annan reconciliation process in Kenya 
(at the request of the Dutch); Iceland's membership 
application (if submitted on time); widening sanctions on 
Burma; and UNSCR 1874 on extending sanctions on North Korea. 
End Summary. 
 
Somalia: EU's Political Strategy 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Wendel said the EU intends to give conclusions on the 
comprehensive political strategy that HiRep Solana began in 
June.  The draft strategy, written by the Commission and 
Council Secretariat, is currently under review by EU members. 
 Wendel said Somalia is nearing a breaking point, and Sweden 
wants to sharpen the strategy to include a set of concrete 
contingencies should a crisis emerge.  Wendel thinks the 
strategy will be ready by the September GAERC.  In the 
discussion of Somalia, Wendel said that EU members are aware 
that Eritrea is "meddling" with Somalia, but it is too early 
to look at sanctions against Asmara. 
 
Georgia: Extending Mandates 
--------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Extending the EUMM and EUSR's Morel's mandates are 
both up for discussion, said Wendel.  FM Bildt wants to focus 
on the technical aspects of extending the mandates, and avoid 
opening up the discussion to broader, political items, 
including the South Caucasus.  Nonetheless, a political 
rational is needed to prolong the mandates.  Sweden wants the 
conclusions to clearly state that Russia has not fulfilled 
all of its commitments since last August, and that South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia are part of Georgia.  Other Member 
States want weaker language that does not name Russia. 
Wendel said FM Carl Bildt will not "throw out" national 
interests and "will hold out as long as possible" to get 
stern language in the conclusions, although the "usual 
members" do not support the specific mention of the two 
regions. 
 
4. (C) FM Bildt is traveling to the Caucasus on 16 July for a 
week as part of a Troika visit.  There are sensitivities to 
meeting with President Saakashvili, Wendel said, and Sweden 
does not support including him in the EUMM mandate 
discussions.  Bildt is hesitant about what can really be 
accomplished. 
 
Iran: Contingencies 
------------------- 
 
5. (C) The discussion topics for this lunch item are still 
being determined, as the EU is waiting to see if the last 
local British Embassy employee is released.  Bildt has been 
in frequent contact with FM Mottaki, who, according to 
Wendel, is playing the "good guy."  However, failed attempts 
over the weekend to set up a call between Bildt and Mottaki 
have raised concern in Sweden.  If the British employee is 
not released by Thursday, the PSC meeting on Friday will be 
consumed with discussing the way ahead with Iran.  One option 
includes "complicating" the issuance of visas for Iranian 
diplomats and officials, and a public announcement of such. 
But visa restrictions would have "shaky legal grounds" 
because a handful of EU members do not require Iranian 
diplomats to have visas to travel.  The Swedes hope that the 
threat would be enough to push the Iranians to release the 
employee, but the Iranians are "experts at finding legal 
loopholes", according to Wendel.  The British might not be 
content with only complicating visa issuance, he added, 
noting that London still advocates pulling all EU Heads of 
Mission out of Iran.  Sweden opposes this, as do other Member 
States. 
 
6. (C) If the employee is not released by July 26, then the 
Swedes anticipate the discussion to focus on withdrawing EU 
diplomats from Iran, even if temporarily.  The Swedes do not 
support this because "there might not be other cards to play" 
and they, along with other EU members, are concerned that 
their local employees in Tehran could be targeted in 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000428  002 OF 002 
 
 
retaliation.  Solidarity among EU members is strong, and if 
the discussion is emotionally charged, then the ministers 
might agree to a withdrawal.  Wendel added that the British 
are pleased with how Sweden has handled the situation. 
 
7. (C) If the British Embassy hostage situation is resolved, 
then ministers will discuss the nuclear &crisis."  Wendel 
said that Sweden was happy with the G8 statement on Iran, 
especially because Russia and China supported it.  The UK 
wants a list of sanctions against Iranian entities to be 
prepared now, Wendel said, but Sweden would prefer to keep 
discussion at a general level because if the Iranians (or the 
Russians or the Chinese) became aware of the EU doing 
"specific" and "legal" work on additional sanctions, then 
they would complain that the EU was never serious about 
giving Iran time to respond to the P5 1 offer.  We realize, 
Wendel continued, that we have used this argument for two 
years now and "for our own credibility" Sweden might now have 
to go along with the consensus view of Member States. 
 
8. (C) Wendel noted that Sweden assesses Iranian leaders have 
"not really made up their minds about where they want the 
process to end."  Will they settle for a break-out 
capability, or do they want to demonstrate their possession 
of a nuclear deterrent like North Korea has done?  Because 
Sweden thinks the Iranians are still trying to decide this, 
Wendel said that the "crunch time" will not come during their 
Presidency but rather during the follow-on Spanish 
Presidency.  Wendel added that Bildt has looked at the 
"assessments of many different countries" relating to the 
pace of Iranian enrichment activity and has concluded that it 
will be "three or four years" before Tehran will have a 
nuclear capability. 
 
A Items: Kenya, Iceland, Burma and North Korea 
------------------------------ 
 
-- (U) Kenya: At Dutch request, there will be conclusions in 
support of the Kofi Annan reconciliation process surrounding 
post-2008 elections. 
 
-- (U) Iceland: Applicant EU members are required to submit 
applications 14 days in advance of a GAERC, which was July 13 
in Iceland's case, said Wendel.  The Icelandic Parliament is 
"unsettled" on the issue, so the application might be delayed 
until September.  In addition, Iceland has not consulted 
beforehand with member countries, as is customary.  EU 
members have warned Sweden not to give preferential treatment 
to Iceland because it is a "Nordic brother."  Sweden, and 
Bildt, would very much like Iceland's membership to be one of 
the accomplishments of its EU Presidency, but Iceland's 
glacial movement on its application is dampening 
expectations. 
 
-- (U) Burma: The verdict in the trial of Aung San Suu Kyi 
might be known on July 24.  In this case, the EU will need to 
respond.  In the event of a guilty verdict, then the only 
response all EU members unanimously support, according to 
Wendel, is to blacklist the four trial judges.  Other ideas 
being floated, but lacking consensus, are to expand the list 
of banned luxury items and to limit sectoral investments by 
EU businesses.  If there is no verdict, then the EU will 
issue a statement. 
 
-- (U) North Korea: The GAERC will produce a paper regarding 
the new set of sanctions under UNSCR 1874.  Normally, a UN 
Security Council resolution should be adopted by the EU 
within 45 days, said Wendel.  There already is some agreement 
on the core set of new sanctions under UNSCR 1874, but the 
Council must agree whenever a common position is changed. 
Wendel noted that Sweden opposes France's proposed expansion 
of the list of luxury goods banned for export to the DPRK, 
but discussion on that topic is ongoing. 
SILVERMAN