Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 2497 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
QA
YE YM YI

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI347, ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE REITERATES IRAN CONCERNS FOR S/SRAP

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ABUDHABI347.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ABUDHABI347 2009-04-05 12:12 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Abu Dhabi
VZCZCXRO9925
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHAD #0347 0951254
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051254Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2332
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0644
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000347 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR S, S/SRAP HOLBROOKE AND S/SAGSWA ROSS 
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND NEA/IR 
 
E.O. 12958: 03/24/2019 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM MOPS IR AF PK AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE REITERATES IRAN CONCERNS FOR S/SRAP 
HOLBROOKE 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD G. OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 
 
1. (S/NF) Summary: During a March 24 meeting with Special 
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, Abu 
Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) expressed his grave 
concerns about the Iranian threat to the region.  MbZ said the 
Iranian response to the Nowruz message was primarily for domestic 
consumption, but that the Iranian leadership is concerned that 
dialogue with the West represents a regime threat.  He said Iran 
would obtain a nuclear weapon unless the regime could be "split from 
inside" before nuclear capability was achieved.  Foreign Minister 
Abdullah bin Zayed argued for continued Gulf consultation in 
conjunction with any U.S. efforts to engage Iran.  (Other topics 
reported septel.)  End Summary. 
 
NOWRUZ STATEMENT 
---------------- 
 
2. (S/NF) MbZ began by telling Amb. Holbrooke that Khamenei's 
response to President's Nowruz statement was designed to send a 
message to the millions of Iranians who saw the statement on the 
Internet that there will be no debate on engagement with the United 
States and/or the West.  MbZ opined that Khamenei had to deliver the 
message personally as an Ahmedinejad response would have fueled 
domestic debate.  Commenting that Khamenei was conveying Iran's 
fundamental lack of trust in the United States, MbZ said the Iranians 
want an apology "for everything from Carter to Bush."  He added that 
the uncharacteristic speed of Khamenei's response indicates the 
extent of the perceived threat that improved relations with the West 
might represent to the leadership's control over the country. 
Specifically, the Iranian regime fears the United States will demand 
the renunciation of its nuclear program, which would be politically 
impossible. 
 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS A CERTAINTY, UNLESS REGIME FALLS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
3. (S/NF) MbZ told Holbrooke he was "100 percent" convinced Iran will 
complete its nuclear weapons program.  He candidly stated his 
personal belief that negotiations with Iran were irrelevant and a 
military solution would only delay the program, not derail it.  MbZ 
said that there was a "third way" between these unacceptable options: 
 Iran is domestically very fragile, and the only way to prevent it 
from acquiring nuclear weapons was to "split them from inside." 
 
4. (S/NF) Turning to his concerns about an armed confrontation, MbZ 
said war with Iran would only harm the UAE.  He is deeply concerned 
that the current Israeli government will initiate military action 
without consultation.  An Israeli attack on Iran would have little 
impact on Iran's capabilities, but MbZ was certain Iran would 
respond.  MbZ argued that the leadership believes its own lies, which 
were "proven" by Iran's success in Basra.  Today's conventional 
Iranian weapons would target the Gulf, while Iran continues to expand 
its missile program with the hope of reaching the West. 
 
CONSULT US 
---------- 
 
5. (S/NF) UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
(AbZ) stressed the importance of a continuation of the P5 plus 1 plus 
GCC plus 3 coordination on Iran.  AbZ said that such consultation in 
2008 "agitated" Iran, but sent a message to Russia and China and 
European allies that the Gulf is seriously concerned about Iranian 
hegemony.  Iran's regional hegemony and nuclear program are two 
issues that the West cannot tackle separately.  AbZ noted that 
countries in the region ("some friends") are concerned that the 
United States, especially under the current administration, would 
engage Iran at the expense of ties with the region.  AbZ said the 
President's Nowruz message supported this theory.  He concluded, "The 
more you engage Iran, the more you must engage the Gulf states." 
(Ambassador Olson's comment:  Abdullah's reference to "friends" was 
Emirati politesse - the UAE is deeply concerned that we are preparing 
to trade, and is interpreting the Nowruz greeting in that way.) 
 
6. (SBU) Ambassador Holbrooke has cleared this message. 
OLSON