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Viewing cable 09ASHGABAT248, TURKMENISTAN: TURKISH AMBASSADOR CONCERNED ABOUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASHGABAT248 2009-02-24 04:04 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Ashgabat
VZCZCXRO0500
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHLH
RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHAH #0248 0550457
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 240457Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2339
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4850
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0085
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 3094
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T ASHGABAT 000248 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN AND NEA/IR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2019 
TAGS: IR PGOV PHUM RS TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: TURKISH AMBASSADOR CONCERNED ABOUT 
POTENTIAL SHIPMENTS OF URANIUM TO IRAN 
 
Classified By: Charge Richard Miles, reasons 1.4(B), (D), (E) and (F). 
 
1. (C) The Turkmen Government announced earlier this month 
that President Berdimuhamedov had signed a decree allowing 
the state chemical concern "Turkmenkhimiya" to enter into a 
contract with Ekomet-S of Russia for the transfer and burial 
of radioactive waste.  The waste was reportedly produced at 
the Hazar chemical plant and at the Balkanabat iodine plant. 
 
2. (S) In a meeting with the Charge on February 17, Turkish 
Ambassador Huseyin Bichakli raised concerns about reports 
that Turkmenistan and Russia plan to resume uranium 
production in Turkmenistan.  He said that he had learned from 
sources that a Russian military delegation had visited 
Turkmenistan in early January and visited the site of a 
former "uranium" plant at Kizilkaya in Balkan Province.  The 
plant operated during the Soviet era.  He said that the 
delegation was also briefed on the planned North-South 
railroad line from Russia to Iran, which includes a 700 km 
stretch through Turkmenistan.  Ambassador Bichakli said there 
were rumors that the railroad would be used to transport 
uranium processed at the currently inactive Turkmen uranium 
plant to Iran. 
 
3. (S) COMMENT: Ambassador Bichakli did not provide his 
sources, but noted that for Turkmenistan to collaborate with 
Russia to transport processed uranium to Iran, particularly 
in a surreptitious manner, is inconsistent with its policy of 
neutrality.  Post will report any further information on this 
issue.  END COMMENT. 
MILES