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Viewing cable 08STATE15220, s) further scheming by german firm to export

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STATE15220 2008-02-14 14:02 2010-12-05 12:12 SECRET Secretary of State
Appears in these articles:
http://www.spiegel.de
P 141433Z FEB 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S e c r e t state 015220

Sipdis


E.o. 12958: decl: 02/14/2033
Tags: parm, prel, ettc, mtcre, ksca, gm, ir

Subject: (s) further scheming by german firm to export
test chamber to iranian ballistic missile program

Ref: a. 05 state 201650

B. 05 berlin 3726
c. 05 state 211408
d. 05 berlin 3954
e. 06 state 36325
f. 06 berlin 674
g. 06 state 62278
h. 06 berlin 1123
i. 06 state 70328
j. 06 berlin 1229
k. 06 berlin 1550
l. Mtcr poc 201/2006 - may 16 2006
m. 07 state 75839
n. 07 berlin 1137
o. 07 state 108420
p. 07 berlin 002163
q. 07 state 166482
r. 07 berlin 2216

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM
for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see
Paragraph 7.

2. (S) Background/Objective: Since November 2005, we have
discussed with German officials efforts by Iran's solid
propellant missile developer - the Shahid Bakeri Industrial
Group (SBIG) - to procure environmental test chambers from
the German firm xxxxxxxxxxxx (Refs).
SBIG has conducted its dealings with xxxxxxxxxxxx through the
Iranian intermediary xxxxxxxxxxxx Ltd. and the missile-related front
companies xxxxxxxxxxxx, and xxxxxxxxxxxx.

3. (S) In April 2006, Germany denied a request by xxxxxxxxxxxx
to export environmental chambers to xxxxxxxxxxxx (Ref K). This
denial came shortly after having been alerted by the USG to
SBIG's use of xxxxxxxxxxxx as a front company (Refs E & G). Germany
has also sensitized xxxxxxxxxxxx GmbH - the
manufacturer of the test chamber - to its concerns about this
case (Ref P).

4. (S) In June 2007, we alerted the FRG that xxxxxxxxxxxx - in
a further attempt to evade German export controls - in
mid-March 2007 suggested to xxxxxxxxxxxx that a thermal shock
chamber be shipped to Iran using Croatian, Romanian or
Russian intermediaries (Ref M). We subsequently advised
German officials that in late May 2007, the Croatian firm
xxxxxxxxxxxx made an offer to xxxxxxxxxxxx - on behalf of xxxxxxxxxxxx -
for the sale of a shock chamber (Ref O).

5. (S) We now have information indicating that as of
mid-December 2007, xxxxxxxxxxxx had
discussed routing the shock chamber through xxxxxxxxxxxx
in the United Arab Emirates. xxxxxxxxxxxx and
xxxxxxxxxxxx apparently agreed to falsely list an entity in
Tajikistan as the end-user, but xxxxxxxxxxxx would actually
forward the chamber directly from the UAE to Iran. xxxxxxxxxxxx also
requested an inspection and training course in Germany for
two or three engineers prior to the machine's shipment to
Iran.

6. (S) Objective: We want to share this most recent
information with FRG officials, and encourage them to
continue their work to prevent xxxxxxxxxxxx from supplying
Iran's solid-fueled ballistic missile program with shock
chambers.

7. (U) Action Request: Department requests Embassy
Berlin approach appropriate host government officials
to deliver the talking points in Paragraph 8 and report
response. Talking points may be left as a non-paper.

8. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(secret//rel germany)

-- Since November 2005, we have been discussing with you
efforts by Iran's xxxxxxxxxxxx to procure environmental test
chambers from the German firm xxxxxxxxxxxx on
behalf of Iran's missile program.

-- In early June 2007, we shared information with you
indicating that in mid-March 2007, xxxxxxxxxxxx was working
with xxxxxxxxxxxx to provide a 2-zone thermal shock chamber type xxxxxxxxxxxx
to Iran's xxxxxxxxxxxx, an entity
associated with the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG),
Iran's primary developer of solid-fueled ballistic missiles.

-- As we advised you in June,xxxxxxxxxxxx representatives
xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx had suggested to
xxxxxxxxxxxx that the shipment be routed through Croatia, Romania,
or Russia in order to disguise the fact that the actual
end-user is in Iran.

-- You will also recall from our subsequent discussions in
August that Croatia's xxxxxxxxxxxx had made a late-May
offer to xxxxxxxxxxxx - on behalf of xxxxxxxxxxxx - for the sale of
the shock chamber, and that xxxxxxxxxxxx had developed plans
to ship the chamber to Croatia, where xxxxxxxxxxxx would act as an
intermediary and forward the equipment to Iran.

-- We now have information indicating that as of December
2007,xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx
continued their discussions related to the purchase by xxxxxxxxxxxx
of a thermal shock chamber on behalf of Iran's solid-fueled
ballistic missile program.

-- Specifically, we understand that xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx
have discussed shipping the test chamber to xxxxxxxxxxxx in the United Arab Emirates.

-- xxxxxxxxxxxx appear to have agreed to falsely list
an entity in Tajikistan as the end-user, but xxxxxxxxxxxx would
actually forward the chamber directly from the UAE to Iran.

-- The test chamber is to be shipped within two to three
months after an advance payment has been made. We do not
know if any such payment has yet occurred.

-- We also understand that xxxxxxxxxxxx requested an inspection and
training course in Germany for two or three engineers prior
to the machine's shipment to Iran.

-- We are grateful for your continued cooperation on this
case, and for measures you have taken in the past to prevent
the shipment of this equipment to Iran.

-- We will continue to provide you with relevant information
on this issue as it becomes available, and look forward to
hearing of any actions your government takes in response to
this information.

End talking points/non-paper.

9. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann with any
questions or follow-up related to this case (202-647-1430 -
herrmannjp2@state.gov or herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov) and slug
reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR, EUR/AGS and EUR/PRA.

10. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at
www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
Rice


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