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Viewing cable 07STATE152317, POST REQUESTED TO FOLLOW UP ON ONGOING MATTERS OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07STATE152317 2007-11-03 05:05 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Secretary of State
O 030503Z NOV 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T STATE 152317 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2027 
TAGS: PARM PREL
SUBJECT: POST REQUESTED TO FOLLOW UP ON ONGOING MATTERS OF 
PROLIFERATION CONCERN RAISED AT APEC BY PRESIDENT BUSH 
 
REF: (A)STATE 071143, (B)STATE 073601, (C)STATE 72896, (D)BEIJING 
5361, (E) STATE 148514 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY EAP DAS THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN: 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (S) URGENT ACTION REQUEST:  IN SEPTEMBER DURING THEIR 
MEETING AT THE APEC SUMMIT IN SYDNEY AUSTRALIA, PRESIDENT 
BUSH DISCUSSED WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT HU STRONG CONCERNS 
RELATING TO THE ONGOING TRANSSHIPMENT VIA BEIJING OF KEY 
BALLISTIC MISSILE PARTS FROM NORTH KOREA TO IRAN'S MISSILE 
PROGRAM.  PRESIDENT BUSH PLEDGED TO RESPOND TO PRESIDENT 
HU'S REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION.  EMBASSY SHOULD ON 
NOVEMBER 3 AT THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEVEL POSSIBLE, DELIVER 
THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 8 WHICH RELATES TO SPECIFIC, TIME- 
SENSITIVE INFORMATION ABOUT AN IMMINENT TRANSSHIPMENT.  IN 
ADDITION, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY POST SHOULD DELIVER 
THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 9 TO MFA AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL 
POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY BY THE AMBASSADOR SINCE THIS IS IN 
RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS. 
 
---------- 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
2. (S/REL CHINA) Post should: 
 
 
--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Request China to stop an 
imminent shipment to Iran's ballistic missile program.  This is the 
same cargo that the Ambassador shared about on October 25 (ref E).  It 
is now scheduled to leave Beijing airport on November 4. 
 
--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Note the importance of this 
demarche since it relates to a topic discussed by Presidents Bush and 
Hu in Sydney.  Embassy should further note that the Embassy will be 
seeking an appointment at the highest level possible to convey a more 
extensive presentation on this topic of ballistic missile parts from 
North Korea to Iran. 
 
--Remind Chinese officials that President Bush has been personally 
engaged on the issue of the transshipment of ballistic missile parts 
between North Korea and Iran via Beijing and that he raised this issue 
with President Hu at the APEC Summit. 
 
-- Seek information on the steps China has taken since the APEC 
discussion to address this issue and impress on them the necessity for 
China to take immediate strong action. 
 
-- Stress that the credibility of UN Security Council actions must be 
maintained by vigorous implementation by UN Member States of UNSC 
resolutions calling for Chapter VII sanctions, particularly 1718, 
1737, and 1747. 
 
--Indicate that the U.S. believes that the proliferation of missile 
technology between North Korea and Iran will increase and that these 
two countries will attempt to conduct these transfers through Chinese 
territory. 
 
--Emphasize the need to inspect cargo and personal goods on regularly 
scheduled flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to Iran in order 
to detect and deter these shipments. 
 
--Explain to Chinese officials that the U.S. carefully reviews the 
intelligence material that we have on shipments before we share it, 
and we ask that Chinese authorities respect this and act on our 
information accordingly and appropriately. 
 
--Indicate that the United States believes that we can work together 
cooperatively and effectively on these issues. 
 
--Express our willingness to continue to share as much information as 
possible to assist China's efforts to uphold these UN Security Council 
resolutions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Background: Ballistic Missile Parts Shipped via Beijing Between North 
Korea and Iran. 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
3. (S/Rel China) Iran and North Korea have continued their 
longstanding cooperation on ballistic missile technology, via air- 
shipments of ballistic-missile related items.   We assess that some of 
these shipments consist of ballistic missile jet vanes that frequently 
transit Beijing on regularly scheduled flights on Air Koryo and Iran 
Air.  We believe that the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is 
the probable end user for these parts.  SBIG is listed in the annex to 
UNSCR 1737 and these jet vanes are controlled under Item 10.A.2 of the 
Missile Technology Control Regime and Item 6 of China's missile- 
related export control regulations.  Moreover, UNSCRs 1718 and 1737 
prohibit the transfer to or from North Korea or Iran, respectively, of 
jet vanes and any other item listed in UNSC document S/2006/815. 
These shipments therefore represent violations of UNSCRs 1718 and 
1737. 
 
4. (S/Rel China) The U.S. has raised this issue with China at the 
highest levels several times in the last few months.  In May 2007, the 
United States informed China of imminent shipments on three separate 
occasions (Refs A,B and C).  Though Chinese officials informed Embassy 
Beijing that China's investigations have found no evidence of these 
transfers, it appears that these shipments did occur and are 
continuing to transit via Beijing.  In addition this issue was raised 
by ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney during bilateral nonproliferation talks 
in August 2007 (Ref D).  The Deputy Secretary also raised this issue 
with Executive Vice Foreign Minister (EVFM) Dai Bingguo via during a 
telephone conversation in August.  Finally, in September 2007, 
President Bush discussed this issue with Chinese President Hu at the 
APEC summit in Sydney.  The two leaders agreed that the USG would 
provide the PRC with further information on these transfers. 
 
5.  (S/Rel China) On October 25 the U.S. provided PRC officials with 
detailed information, including the airway bill and flight number, of 
another imminent shipment of military related goods from North Korea 
to Iran via Beijing.  This shipment was also assessed as destined for 
Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid 
Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG).  We now have information that the 
goods will be shipped on November 4 and insist on a substantive 
response from China to this information. 
 
6. (S/Rel China) Our information indicates that at least 10 air 
shipments of jet vanes have transited Beijing thus far and that these 
shipments will not only continue but will also grow in volume.  We 
have encouraged the Chinese to undertake frequent inspections of cargo 
on Air Koryo or Iran Air flights transiting Beijing from North Korea 
to both deter and detect these shipments. 
 
7. (S/Rel China) The Department is seeking both immediate action on 
this new information and a strategic approach with regards to this 
critical issue.  We assess that the best way to prevent these 
shipments in the future is for Chinese authorities to take action, 
such as those identified in para 9, that will make the Beijing airport 
a less hospitable transfer point. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
NON-PAPER ON URGENT MATTER TO BE DELIVERED NOVEMBER 3 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
8. (S/Rel China) Begin points: 
 
-- Last week we raised with you information regarding North Korean 
plans to send a shipment, probably for Iran's ballistic missile 
program, to Iran.  We believe the cargo is intended for Iran's Shahid 
Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's 
solid-propellant ballistic missile program.  You had requested 
additional information. 
 
-- We now have reason to believe that the items above will be shipped 
to Iran via scheduled Iran Air flight on November 4. 
 
--If these goods are missile-related, North Korea is prohibited under 
UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-related items and UN Member States 
are prohibited from importing those items.  In addition, North Korea 
would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring 
these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components 
included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they 
would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery 
systems.  Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the 
mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these 
concerns in mind we are asking that Chinese authorities investigate 
this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
BEGIN NON-PAPER FOR DELIVERY BY AMBASSADOR 
------------------------------------------ 
 
9. (S/REL CHINA) Begin Points: 
 
--Over the past several months we have raised with Chinese officials 
the problem of ballistic missile-related transfers between Iran and 
North Korea being transshipped through China.  President Bush raised 
U.S. concerns on this matter with President Hu during the APEC summit 
in Sydney, demonstrating the importance of the issue to the United 
States.  In response to President Hu's request for additional details, 
we are providing you further information regarding these activities. 
Specifically, we are urgently providing information regarding an 
imminent shipment of serious concern. 
 
-- North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile- 
related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those 
items.  In addition, North Korea would  potentially be precluded under 
UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the 
missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or 
China determines that they would contribute to the development of 
nuclear weapon delivery systems.  Moreover, SBIG is designated in 
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, 
is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. 
With these concerns in mind we are insisting that Chinese authorities 
urgently investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to 
Iran. 
 
--We are very concerned that North Korean shipments of jet vanes occur 
on regularly scheduled commercial air flights transiting through 
Beijing.  We believe this has been the case on about 10 flights. 
 
--These items are likely intended for Iran's solid propellant missile 
development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG). 
 
--These cargo shipments probably include front companies. 
 
--We have identified a large number of shipments beginning late last 
year of what are probably ballistic missile-related items that have 
transited Beijing, and we would like to share further information on 
these shipments. 
 
--14 December 2006: A delegation from SBIG returned from Pyongyang 
probably via Beijing and transported what we assess to be jet vanes 
for a solid propellant medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) under 
development in Iran. 
 
--On or about 15 January 2007: North Korea delivered what were 
probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to 
SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger 
flights. 
 
--On or around 23 January 2007: North Korea delivered what were 
probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to 
SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger 
flights. 
 
--On or about 16 May 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were 
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to 
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled 
commercial passenger flights. 
 
--On or about 24 May 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were 
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to 
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled 
commercial passenger flights. 
 
--On or about 6 June 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were 
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to 
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled 
commercial passenger flights. 
 
-- On or about 12 June 2007: An air shipment composed of five what 
were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was 
scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- 
scheduled commercial passenger flights. 
 
--On or about 14 June 2007: An air shipment composed of three what 
were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was 
scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- 
scheduled commercial passenger flights. 
 
--On or about 14 July 2007: An air shipment composed of ten what were 
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to 
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled 
commercial passenger flights. 
 
--On or about 26 July 2007: An air shipment possibly composed of an 
unknown number of jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was 
scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- 
scheduled commercial passenger flights. 
 
--On or about 22 August: An air shipment possibly composed of one jet 
vane from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North 
Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger 
flights. 
 
--We believe that the number of jet vanes sent to Iran will increase 
dramatically in the future. 
 
--To date we believe that about 40 probable jet vanes have been sent 
from North Korea to Iran. 
 
--The contract for these components called for a total number of 500 
and we assess that shipments of these may increase to a rate of 100- 
160 per month. 
 
--In addition, our information indicates that a second order of 1,500 
components - possibly additional jet vanes - was agreed to in December 
of last year. 
 
-- We believe that this trade will continue to utilize regularly- 
scheduled commercial passenger flights. 
 
--As we have discussed on several occasions, Iran also has been 
seeking probable tungsten-copper alloy plates from China's Dalian 
Sunny Industries, also known as LIMMT.  Dalian Sunny Industries 
shipped part of an order for this material in September.  These plates 
are suitable for Iranian domestic production of jet vanes or as an 
insulator for ballistic missile components.  Iran could be seeking 
these plates in case North Korea is unable to provide the quantity or 
quality of jet vanes required. 
 
--We urge you to prevent such shipments via whatever action you deem 
appropriate, including frequent inspection of Iran Air and Air Koryo 
flights.  The use of regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights 
indicates that frequent regular inspections of Iran Air flights and 
Air Koryo flights are in order and would help deter these shipments in 
the future. 
 
--We will continue to provide you with relevant information to help 
end this proliferation. 
 
------------------------------ 
Reporting Requirement and POC 
------------------------------ 
 
10. (U) Please report delivery of cable and any immediate response by 
November 8, 2007. 
 
11. (U) Washington point-of-contact for follow-up information is 
Matthew Zartman (202) 647-7588, zartmanml@state.sgov.gov.  Please slug 
all responses for ISN, T, and EAP. Washington appreciates Post's 
assistance. 
 
 
RICE