Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 2497 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
QA
YE YM YI

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06REYKJAVIK22, FRAUD SUMMARY - ICELAND

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06REYKJAVIK22.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06REYKJAVIK22 2006-01-18 18:06 2011-01-13 05:05 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Reykjavik
VZCZCXYZ0017
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRK #0022/01 0181852
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181852Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2516
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0186
INFO RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0283
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0205
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0118
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0107
UNCLAS REYKJAVIK 000022 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, ALSO PASS TO KCC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC IC
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - ICELAND 
 
REF:  05 STATE 205073 
 
1.  Summary:  Iceland is comparatively a low-fraud country. 
No identifiable, consistant fraud patterns involving U.S. 
passports or immigrant visas currently exist in Iceland. 
End Summary 
 
2.  This cable updates the country fraud summary for Iceland 
per ref A. 
 
COUNTRY CONDITIONS:  As a prosperous, democratic country 
with an extensive and generous social welfare sytem, Iceland 
is not generally characterized by the political, economic, 
and social conditions which create widespread fraud. 
Iceland has a large foreign-born population of approximately 
8 percent.  This group consists of both naturalized 
Icelandic citizens and permanent residents.  Integration 
into Icelandic society by non-native populations can vary 
widely depending on individual circumstances and factors 
such as language, culture, employment and housing.  Iceland 
participates in the Visa Waiver Program.  Most Icelandic 
passports and national IDs are machine-readable and Iceland 
will start producing biometric passports in 2006.  Obtaining 
fraudulent birth certificates or other registry items is 
difficult since all records are computerized, centrally 
stored, and easy to verify.  At the same time, Iceland has a 
large number of asylum seekers who have not been able to 
document their identity.  Most of them are able to obtain 
restricted Icelandic alien passports.  In some cases, these 
insufficently identified persons can even obtain Icelandic 
citizenship and passports, allowing them to travel on the 
Visa Waiver Program. 
 
The overall adjusted refusal rate was 6.3 percent, down 
slightly from last year.  A part-time FSN NIV specialist 
manages fraud prevention efforts at post.  During FY2005 
post focused its anti-fraud efforts on information sharing, 
training and management. 
 
3.  NIV FRAUD:  Although petty NIV fraud is minimal, post 
pays careful attention to applicants seeking visas for 
extended visits (often in connection with unauthorized 
employment), young Icelandic applicants applying for a B1/B2 
(with the intention of working as baby sitters), "new 
Icelanders" (who only recently obtained Icelandic 
citizenship), third-country nationals resident in Iceland, 
and non-resident NIV applicants.  During FY2005, post 
received NIV applications from citizens from 44 countries. 
The most significant third country national groups are 
citizens of Poland (15 applications), Norway (12 
applications), Lithuania (9 applications), Romania (6 
applications), Denmark (6 applications) and Great Britain (6 
applications). 
 
Post receives approximately 2 turnaround reports each month, 
mainly for previous overstays on the Visa Waiver Program or 
evidence of intended illegal employment. 
Post had two NIV applicants that were suspected to have 
fraudulent passports.  After taking these passports to the 
Icelandic Immigration Authorities and using their equipment 
to examine these passports post was assured that these 
passports where genuine, just in bad condition.  One of the 
applicants obtained a new passport and qualified for a Visa. 
The other applicant was refused under 214b. 
 
4.  IV FRAUD:  The IV units's main fraud concern is family 
based IV applications from third-country nationals with 
foreign birth, marriage and police certificates.  During 
this period there was one suspected case.  In that case 
there was a concern if a marriage between an American 
citizen husband and an Icelandic citizen wife was solely for 
Immigrant Visa purposes.  The wife had an overstay in the 
U.S. and there was a concern if the marriage was genuine.  A 
DHS officer from London came to Iceland to interview the 
couple and approved the petition.  The case will be finished 
here in Iceland. 
 
5.  DV FRAUD:  Post did not uncover any cases involving DV 
fraud during FY2005.  The majority of DV applicants in 
Iceland are Icelandic citizens.  That makes it easier for 
the post to examine documents. 
 
6.  ACS FRAUD:  U.S. passport fraud is minimal at post. 
During this period there was one suspected case.  The case 
involved an American soldier stationed in Bahrain whose 
Ethiopian wife obtained fraudulent documents for employment 
in Bahrain.  Their child was born in Bahrain with the 
mother's fraudulent name on the birth certificate.  The case 
is still open.  False claims to U.S. citizenship and photo- 
substituted identification documents are the main fraud 
concerns in the ACS unit.  Lost or stolen passport cases 
occur frequently as many tourists come to Iceland and lose 
their passports. 
 
7.  ADOPTION FRAUD:  Post does not handle any adoption 
documents. 
 
8.  ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Post did not 
uncover any cases involving asylum fraud during FY2005. 
 
9.  COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: 
Cooperation between post and the Icelandic authorities 
issuing passports and investigating fraud is very good.  The 
Border Police have excellent equipment to investigate 
fraudulent documents and have willingly assisted post 
whenever post has requested it. 
 
10.  AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN:  Iceland is a transit 
point for alien traffickers and refugees from China, Africa 
and Eastern Europe.  It is relatively easy to obtain 
Icelandic refugee travel documents or alien passports even 
when the identity of the applicant is not clearly 
established.  Some refugees become naturalized Icelandic 
citizens within three to seven years, and thus are eligible 
for travel on the Visa Waiver program.  Post has also seen 
an increased number of media reports about alien smugglers 
trafficking Chinese women through Iceland to other countries 
in Western Europe and potentially to the United States. 
 
11.  STAFFING AND TRAINING:  We do not have a Fraud 
Prevention Unit at post.  All consular LES staff are cross- 
trained in basic fraud prevention tools and tactics.  One of 
the LES staff received the Fraud Prevention training at FSI 
and held an information session at post sharing what she had 
learnt at FSI for the Consular Section and the Regional 
Security Office.  The Consular Section used the Consular 
Leadership Day in January 2005 to strengthen the 
relationship between the section and the Icelandic Border 
Police at the airport.  They showed post their equipment and 
how they make use of it.  They also informed post of the 
kinds of cases with which they had been dealing and how they 
had been able to detect these cases.  Post recommends 
additional fraud prevention training for the Consular 
Officer. 
 
VAN VOORST